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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The real and only issue of this case seems to be if an 
appellant can cite eclesiastical non-legal authority with a cruel and 
unusual punishment allegation and obtain and prevail on an appeal. 
Sub-issues might exist if the legislative penalties for 
public safety misdemeanors and ignoring court orders are rational. 
The sufficiency of the evidence presented and the jury's prerogative 
to believe a witness might also be an issue raised. 
-iii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs. : Case No. 860027 
HOWARD RODNEY MILLIGAN, l 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Howard Rodney Milligan, was charged with the 
offenses of driving without a license and failure to appear, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-2-2 and U.C.A. 41-6-168. 
Defendant was tried in absentia in a bench trial in the 
Justice Court, Third Precinct, Salt Lake County, Utah, the 
Honorable Dan K. Armstrong, Justice of the Peace, presiding (R. 
3). He was found guilty as charged (R. 3). 
Defendant appealed to the Third Judicial District Court 
and was accorded a trial de novo on November 8, 1985, before the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup. Following a jury trial, defendant was 
found guilty of both charges. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 8, 1985, Officer Geasper Bowman responded to 
a call for assistance at the scene of a traffic accident on 4500 
South and 1700 Westf within the boundaries of Utah Technical 
College (R. 169-70). Officer Bowman is a police officer for Utah 
Technical College (R. 169). 
The accident was caused by a small sedan which, when 
making a right-hand turn, slid into defendant's van due to the 
slick condition of the road (R. 170). Defendant's van was parked 
at the light waiting to turn (R. 170). In the course of 
investigating the accident. Officer Bowman asked the drivers of 
both vehicles to produce their driver's licenses and 
registrations (R. 171) . Defendant gave the officer his 
registration, but stated that he did not have a driver's license 
(R. 171) . After Officer Bowman ran a background check and 
verified that defendant did not have a license, he issued a 
citation to defendant for failure to have a driver's license (R. 
172). Defendant signed the citation (R. 172)• The officer read 
to defendant the information on the citation stating that he had 
"no less than 5 days nor more than 15 days" to appear as promised 
(R. 173). 
Officer Bowman then contacted the defendant's wife who 
drove the vehicle away and he contacted the Driver's License 
Department to make certain that defendant truly did not have a 
license (R. 173). The department's records showed that defendant 
must have had an old license which was expired (R. 173). 
On March 18, 1985, a clerk at Utah Technical College 
for Salt Lake County, contacted defendant who said that he did 
not need to appear (R. 2). On March 19, 1985, a notice of 
failure to appear was issued (R. 2). On June 19, 1985, a plea of 
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not guilty was issued on both counts by the court because 
defendant refused to enter a plea (R. 3). Defendant signed the 
notice of trial stating he knew the trial would be held in 
absentia if he failed to appear (R. 3). The trial was held on 
August 14, 1985 in absentia because defendant did not appear as 
promised (R. 3). The court then found defendant guilty of both 
counts (R.3). The court sentenced defendant to 15 days in jail, 
$150.00 fine, and $6.00 post assessment fee for no driver's 
license and 5 days in jail, $50.00 fine and $4.00 post assessment 
fee for failure to appear (R. 3). Both jail terms were to be 
suspended on payment of fines (R. 3). 
On appeal, defendant requested a district court trial 
de novo by jury. At the trial defendant represented himself pro 
se. Officer Bowman appeared as a witness for the prosecution. A 
four-person jury found defendant guilty on both counts. The 
district court imposed the same sentence as the lower court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's failure to provide this Court with any case 
or statutory authority to support his appeal of error in 
accordance with the rules of appellate procedure require summary 
affirmance of his convictions and sentences. Since the 
regulation of motor vehicles on the highways is a proper subject 
for state control, his arrest and conviction for driving without 
a license was constitutionally valid. The officer was authorized 
to make the arrest, there was sufficient evidence to support a 
jury finding of guilty, and the sentence imposed on defendant was 
just. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCE SHOULD 
BE SUMMARILY AFFIRMED BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS 
FAILED TO CITE ANY LAW OR FACTS REQUIRING A 
REVERSAL. 
In his brief on appeal, defendant fails to provide any 
legal authorities or logical analysis to support his arguments. 
He refers generally to the United States Constitution and the 
Utah State Constitution but fails to link this claim to any 
issue raised on appeal. No statutory or case authorities are 
cited for any issue other than cites to the Utah Code of Criminal 
Procedure. In State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984), this 
Court held that "[slince the defendant fails to support [her] 
argument by any legal analysis or authority, we decline to rule 
on it." Defendants convictions and sentence should therefore be 
summarily affirmed. 
Defendant also fails to cite to the trial record or 
transcript to support pertinent factual allegations upon which 
he bases his legal arguments. Under these circumstances, the 
Court should assume the correctness of the jury's verdict and the 
trial court's judgment and affirm defendant's convictions and 
sentence. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6) (1985). 
State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 253 (Utah 1983) (correctness of 
trial court's judgment is assumed when counsel on appeal fails to 
comply with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 75(p)(2)(2)(d) (1977)--
the rule that preceded Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a) (6) 
(1985); State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681 (Utah 1985) (failure to 
cite to the record is grounds for affirming the decision of the 
court below); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 757 (Utah 1982). 
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In that Mtlhe burden of showing error is on the party 
who seeks to upset the judgment," State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 
1267 (Utah 1982)r the State or this Court should not be put to 
the task of developing defendant's legal arguments either by 
supplying plausible legal analysis for those arguments, or by 
searching through the record and making references thereto to 
support defendant's factual allegations. The obligation to 
direct the Court to pertinent legal authority and to parts of the 
record falls upon the defendant, and since defendant does not, 
the appeal should be denied or the trial court summarily 
affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE REGULATION OF THE HIGHWAYS AND MOTOR 
VEHICLES IS A PROPER PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-
JECT FOR STATE CONTROL. 
Defendant contends that, as a citizen of the United 
States, he is entitled to a constitutional right of locomotion 
(Brief of Appellant at p. 2). It is well settled that the United 
States Constitution protects an individual's right to travel on 
public highways, as well as the public's right to highway safety. 
See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978); Kent v. Dulles, 
357 U.S. 116 (1958). See also Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 
P.2d 46, 48 (1966); Standish v. Dept. of Revenue, M.V.D., 683 
P.2d 1276, 1281 (1984); and Crocker v. Colorado Dept. of Revenue, 
652 P.2d 1067, 1072 (Colo. 1982). 
It is also clear that the States have police powers to 
promote public health and safety. In Bastian v. King 661 P.2d 
953, 956 (Utah 1983), the Supreme Court held: 
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It is the power and responsibility of the 
Legislature to enact laws to promote the 
public health, safety, morals and general 
welfare of society, icitation omitted] 
and this Court will not substitute our 
judgment for what of the Legislature with 
respect to what best serves the public 
interest. 
The court also clearly stands for the logical proposition that 
the "conditions for operation of a motor vehicle on public roads 
is a proper subject for state regulation and control.11 State v. 
Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah 1985). 
Defendant was convicted of offenses under the Motor 
Vehicle Code, Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-2-2 and 4-5-168 (R. 128). The 
respective violations for each section of the Utah Code were 
driving without a license and failure to appear at court, both 
motor vehicle class "B" misdemeanors. The State's regulation of 
each of these violations is a logical and legitimate exercise of 
the State's broad police power. 
As early as 1913, in Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 
U.S. 610 (1913), the defendant challenged the State of Maryland's 
power to regulate the public streets, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held: 
[A] State may rightfully prescribe 
uniform regulations necessary for public 
safety and order in respect to the oper-
ation upon its highways of all motor 
vehicles—those moving in interstate 
commerce as well as others. And to this 
end it may require the registration of 
such vehicles and the licensing of their 
drivers. . . . This is but an exercise 
of the police power uniformly recognized 
as belonging to States and essential to 
the preservation of the health, safety 
and comfort of their citizens; and it 
does not constitute a direct and material 
burden on interstate commerce. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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235 U.S. at 632. 
Since the Utah safety statutes constitute a legitimate 
exercise of a State's police power, and the defendant's 
al legations to the contrary are without merit, the conviction 
should be log ica l ly upheld. 
POINT H I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
JURY'S GUILTY VERDICT. 
Defendant argues that the evidence presented was 
insufficient to convict him since the officer did not actually 
see him drive and Officer Bowman was the only witness at trial. 
At the trial, Officer Bowman testified that he knew 
that defendant had been driving because another officer pointed 
out the two drivers and defendant himself indicated that he was 
the operator of the van (R. 40). Defendant cooperated with the 
officer as the driver and never claimed not to be the driver. 
The peace officer merely needs to have "grounds to believe that 
person to have been driving or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle." Ballard v. State Motor Vehicle Division, 595 
P.2d 1302, 1306 (Utah 1979). Officer Bowman had probable cause 
or reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was or had been 
in actual physical control of the van at the time of the accident 
based upon reason the "totality of the circumstances" test. 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See State v. 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980). Officer Bowman could 
reasonably determine from witness statements, his total combined 
observations, the vehicle registration, admissions from the 
defendant and his personal contact with defendant that defendant 
had been driving. 
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Appellant may argue that Officer Bowman could not have 
had reasonable grounds under the total facts and circumstances 
test upon which to base his belief that defendant was the driver 
because Bowman did not actually "see" him drive, however, as this 
Court points out, "certain knowledge of guilt" is not required. 
State v. Hatcher, 495 P.2d 159, (Utah 1972). Reasonableness 
under the total circumstances is still the test. 
In State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479 (Utah 1983) , the jury 
believed appellant to be the driver of the vehicle that caused 
the collision, although neither the witnesses nor the arresting 
officer who arrived some time after the accident had actually 
seen the appellant driving. The Court held that there was 
sufficient circumstantial evidence "from the witnesses, who 
testified to having seen appellant crawl out of the vehicle, to 
justify the officer's belief that appellant was the driver of the 
vehicle." In frawson and other cases, the arresting officer did 
not see the appellant drive, however the courts have held the 
grounds for belief to be reasonable even when based upon 
citizens' statements and circumstantial evidence. Certainly, the 
jury in this case could find that Office Bowman could reasonably 
believe that defendant was the driver, even if that belief was 
based solely upon the uncontradicted statements of a fellow 
officer made in the presence of the driver. This vehicle was 
also registered to the arrestee who was present and who provided 
the officer with his vehicle registration and who did not deny 
that he had been driving his own vehicle. 
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Officer Bowman, as the witness for the prosecution, 
presented his testimony based upon his personal knowledge and 
observation at the accident scene. Defendant had the opportunity 
during the trial to testify, deny, cross-examine the officer and 
to produce witnesses for his defense if he could. Defendant 
argues solely that more than one witness is necessary in order to 
support a conviction. But, the function of the jury is to 
determine the truthfulness of the witness and the weight of the 
evidence. It is irrelevant how many witnesses testify as long as 
the evidence presented is legally competent and admissible under 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, and believed by the jury. 
In addition to the peace officer's testimony, two 
uncontested exhibits were entered into evidence. Exhibit 1 was a 
certified copy of defendant's driving record. It was offered to 
show that the date and time of the accident, a valid driver's 
license in defendant's name was outstanding (R. 181). 
Exhibit 2 was the original citation issued by Officer 
Bowman which contained defendant's signature to the statement 
"Without admitting guilt I promise to appear as directed herein." 
(R 34 and 35). This was offered to show that defendant knew of 
is duty to appear and of his promise to do so. Also, the Court 
took judicial notice of the court record which showed that 
although the defendant was contacted by a clerk at Utah Technical 
College, defendant refused to appear and a notice and information 
concerning failure to appear was issued (R. 183). 
The issues of whether the defendant was driving without 
a valid driver's license and whether defendant failed to appear 
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before the court were questions of fact for the jury* He did not 
deny that he was the driver and he admitted in court that he did 
not appear (R. 202 and 203) . The testimony presented by the 
officer and the admitted exhibits were sufficient to support and 
uphold a verdict of guilty. 
POINT IV 
THE OFFICER WAS AUTHORIZED TO ARREST DEFENDANT. 
Defendant argues that Officer Bowman did not have the 
authority to arrest him because he was not a Category I officer 
at the time of the arrest (Appellant's Brief, p. 5). Defendant 
believes that Officer Bowman was actually a Category II peace 
officer at the time of arrest (Appellant's Brief, p.5) . This 
argument of defendant is very confusing. 
At the trial, Officer Bowman testified that he was a 
certified Category One police officer [and at the time of the 
arrest, employ.ed by the Utah Technical College.] During 
defendant's cross-examination of Bowman, the office explained 
that he graduated from the academy in December of 1982 , and that 
he returned to the Peace Officer's Academy in the summer of 1985 
in order to comply with a recent change in the law requiring that 
all peace officers fulfill the same requirements as state police 
officers (R. 175). The change in the law did not affect Officer 
Bowman's authority or competence at the time of the arrest. 
Indeed, defendant has included in his brief copies of Officer 
Bowman's certificates of completion, dated December 7, 19 82 and 
July 17, 1985, both prior to the January 8, 1985 accident and 
citation. 
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The defendant does not challenge the arrest on the 
basis of jurisdiction nor does he claim that a Category I officer 
is not authorized to arrest or to issue citations. Therefore 
obviously Officer Bowman was legally authorized to issue 
defendant a citation for driving without a license. 
POINT V 
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON DEFENDANT WAS 
LAWFUL AND REASONABLE. 
Defendant claims that the sentence imposed on him by 
Judge Armstrong and upheld by Judge Rigtrup constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment because the fine is higher than the guidelines 
set for bail and because the sentence included some 
incarceration. Defendant seems to believe that the bail schedule 
sets the mandatory fine and he believes that his fine was higher 
than the bail limits solely because of his request for a jury. 
Fines and imprisonment are limited by statute and are 
not set by the bail schedule. Obviously a fine is not the same 
as a security amount set for bail. The former is a punishment 
for violating the law and depends on the gravity of the 
infractions, and the latter is only a guaranty that the person 
charged will appear before the court for trial. 
There is no evidence that the defendant was fined an 
excessive amount because of his request for a jury. In factf the 
sentence was first imposed by Judge Armstrong in a non-jury 
trial. Then Judge Rigtrup uniformly imposed the exact same 
sentence, despite the four-person jury implemented at defendant's 
request at the trial de novo. The record also shows that the 
offenses for which defendant was convicted are Class B 
-11-
misdemeanors. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204(2) states that a person 
convicted of a Class B misdemeanor can be imprisoned up to but 
not exceeding six months. Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-301(4) states 
that a fine for a Class B misdemeanor is not to exceed $1,000.00. 
This penalty is not disproportionate and generally not questioned 
by this Court. State v. Nance. 438 P.2d 542 (Utah 1968). Since 
defendant's sentence is much less than what is statutorily 
allowed, "reasonable11 or "rational" for such offenses, it cannot 
be termed an example of "cruel and unusual punishment." State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has failed to assert any authoritative 
grounds for his assertions. Since defendant was convicted by a 
jury of his peers on the basis of legally competent evidence, and 
reasonably sentenced, the respondent respectfully requests this 
Court to summarily affirm the defendant's convictions and 
sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2nd day of September, 19S6. 
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